Abstract The IPCC's fifth assessment report of Working Group III has just come out. It pays special attention to the 2°C temperature target and tells us that the window of opportunity to prevent such climate change is rapidly closing. Yet, the report also presents a portfolio of stabilization targets, reflecting a fundamental ambiguity: there is no unique Bdangerousĉ limate threshold. Here, we describe a framework for the evaluation of optimal climate policy given an uncertain formal climate threshold. We find that uncertainty leads to moving targets: even when the available information does not change, future regulators will tend to relax current climate plans. We develop a reduced form integrated assessment model to assess the quantitative significance of our findings. We calibrate preferences such that in 2000 a stabilization target of 450 ppmv maintains the optimal balance between climate risks and abatement costs. The naïve equilibrium ultimately reaches a peak of 570 ppmv, missing the 2000 stabilizations targets by a wide margin. Our results offer an explanation for the inertia in mitigation efforts over the past decades: policies often delay the majority of abatement efforts. Yet, believing that subsequent regulators will uphold the planned future efforts is self-defeating.
fifth assessment report (Edenhofer et al. 2014) . The choice for an ensemble of stabilization scenarios is reasonable. There is no scientific basis for a unique threshold that identifies a 'dangerous' level of climate perturbation. Climate change policy can be framed as risk management. There is ample uncertainty with respect to the ultimate consequences of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions: a large variety exists for estimates of the climate sensitivity, long-run depreciation of atmospheric CO2, ice-melting, eco-system adaptation, agricultural costs, and other impacts. In addition to that, people vary to a large degree with respect to their evaluation of the consequences, and it is reasonable to evaluate the risk, or approximate the expected social costs of a gradual climate change by a smooth function, rather than imposing a sharp threshold. Despite the lack of hard boundaries for a climate catastrophe, the fifth WG3 report pays most attention to the 2°C target and indicates that the window of opportunity to prevent such climate change is closing, rapidly. Previous reports have not been followed by sufficient mitigation action; more effort is required to limit temperature increases to 2°above pre-industrial levels, quickly and comprehensively. 1 We provide an analysis of climate mitigation preferences that predicts a pattern of delay in mitigation as the outcome of reasoned decisions. Our analysis suggests that climate policy plans in terms of emissions paths are not successful in reducing emissions. Instead, one needs to look for policy plans that act as commitment, e.g., by reducing future costs of mitigation.
The absence of a clear climate threshold beyond which catastrophes occur, greatly magnifies the free-rider problem between countries (Barrett and Dannenberg 2012) . In this paper, we add a concern to that. Not only does uncertainty hamper international coordination, it also makes more pressing the inter-temporal inconsistency of stabilization policies. We find that future regulators have a reasoned motive to come back on previous stabilization pledges. As a result, stabilization targets are consciously weakened over time.
Our analysis reveals that climate stabilization targets can be understood as implementing preferences that are time-inconsistent. The intuition is uncomplicated. Consider that each successive regulator represents the preferences of the people at that time. We assume the regulator is impatient over short horizons, as is common in the economic literature. But at the same time we consider the regulator has an intrinsic desire to limit the risk of long-run climate impact, e.g., through limiting cumulative emissions. Then, the regulator prefers a policy path in which costly mitigating measures are postponed, possibly until after he leaves office. The approach we set out here has three key features. First, our assumed preferences square seemingly contradictory evidence from financial markets, in which observed saving rates suggest a high time preference, and from stated preference studies that indicate a real concern for the far future (Layton and Levine 2003) . Second, our approach takes seriously the notion of precaution. The uncertainty regarding the effect of climate change on the environment plus the uncertainty about the ability of man-made goods to substitute for lost ecosystem services, calls into question the use of a monetized expected value of all climate change consequences, and recommends a social welfare criterion that values climate stabilization directly rather than purely instrumentally through reducing future economic losses. Third, the model can explain why policymakers propose ambitious climate targets but simultaneously eschew the measures that climate stabilization calls for.
The seminal paper by Wigley et al. (1996) illustrated an important mechanism. They argued that the IPCC (1995) pathways for a set of exogenous climate targets were unnecessarily costly, and could be met at a lower cost by delaying emission reductions because positive capital returns imply that future mitigation is less costly from the perspective of today's regulator than immediate action. But WRE did not consider the formation of these targets, nor did they envisage that subsequent regulators, making their own tradeoff between the costs and benefits of climate policies, are not necessarily willing to bear the costs of stringent targets that the previous regulators have imposed on them. Future regulators can reject previous plans and accept a less stringent target than their predecessors if such is favorable from their future perspective. We find that when policymakers are naïve and do not recognize that their successors will not want to implement the measures they have premeditated for them, a path unfolds where each successive regulator postpones far-reaching mitigation and strives for an increasingly less ambitious target.
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Our research quantifies the consequences of such naivety with a reduced form integrated assessment model (IAM). We find that if preferences are calibrated such that for the conditions in 2000, they generate a stabilization plan of 450 ppmv, ultimately the same preferences will lead to a much higher carbon concentration, eventually reaching 570 ppmv. The implications of our analysis are such: if the two degree temperature increase target that was formulated by the EU in 1996, and formalized in the Copenhagen Accord, is implemented through a costeffective stabilization plan, then the target will almost certainly be missed as future generations, if they have the same type of preferences as the current generation that has set the target, will renegotiate and consciously decide on a change of course towards higher temperatures. Our results offer another motivation for immediate action (as opposed to a policy that delays the majority of costly actions) and highlight the importance of commitment devices in climate policy, such as large-scale investment programs for renewable energy that are costlier to reverse than emission reduction pledges.
Endogenous targets
In our model, the regulator in control at time τ maximizes a weighted sum of discounted utility U from material consumption, discounted at rate ρ, and a perceived welfare cost Γ(.) that is associated with some climate target Λ and increasing and convex. We abstract from international coordination problems and assume a global cooperative approach. For sake of convenience, in our numerical assessment we consider the maximum stock of atmospheric CO2 Atm t that will be reached in the future (or has been reached in the past) 3 as the climate target variable Λ, but other targets such as cumulative emissions or a temperature ceiling produce similar outcomes.
We interpret the regulator as an institution that represents the interests and preferences of all people at time τ. Thus, W τ represents the welfare of generation τ, and the vector (W 1 , W 2, …) represents the vector of welfare for all generations. In this representation, an efficient allocation is one where the outcome vector is on the boundary of the feasibility set, and which would maximize
For some vector of welfare weights α τ . We consider what happens if each regulator naively sets its policy consistently with its own preferences, without anticipating that future preferences deviate. It is clear from the outset that, as preferences are not time-consistent, the outcome of the process may not be Pareto efficient. Through a numerical exercise, we will gauge the magnitude of changes in plans.
The first part of the welfare function assumes the standard exponential discounting of the future stream of utility. That is, the representative agent prefers high utility above low utility, and trades off future utility against current utility at discount rate ρ. We can interpret the preferences as representing peoples' choices over their own life-time, or as representing bequests between generations, or a combination of both. Alternatively, we can impose a higher weight for far-future generations by exploiting quasi-hyperbolic discounting, as in Gerlagh and Liski (2013) , but we do not intend to complicate the analysis unnecessarily.
The second part of the welfare function Γ(.) is new to the IAM literature; it describes the evaluation of intangible damages not associated with (future) consumption losses, and captures the dislike of the representative agent to add risk to the climate system by increasing the atmospheric CO 2 content, representing decision making under scientific uncertainty. The approach is similar to a cost-risk analysis, applied to climate change in Schmidt et al. (2011) and Neubersch et al. (2014) . In these papers, a regulator minimizes a weighted sum of mitigation costs and the probability of staying below an exogenous temperature target. Neubersch et al. (2014) also look at a welfare criterion that maximizes expected discounted utility minus expected discounted degree years, i.e., the discounted sum of temperature increases above pre-industrial levels. In choosing time-consistent welfare-functionals, they do not look at conflicts between subsequent regulators however. We recall that the regulator's objective function is assumed to represent the preferences of all people at time τ. That is, the function Γ(.) describes the trade-off that the representative consumer at time τ is willing to make when choosing between utility derived from the stream of consumption and the climate risks imposed on future generations. We can think of these risks as coming from tipping points that can be passed, even unknowingly. 4 We assume that Γ(280ppmv)=0, Γ′(.)>0, Γ″(.)>0, meaning that the regulator perceives no risk, or has no dislike for the 'pre-industrial' state of the climate, and that its perceived risk increases more than proportionally with increasing atmospheric CO2. The climate cost function as a reduced form captures scientific uncertainty: we can write Γ(P(Λ)) for Γ(Λ), where P(.) is the cumulative probability of a 'catastrophic' event dependent on the state of the climate. If Γ(P(.)) is linear in P(.), the approach is consistent with risk-neutral optimization of expected welfare. The shape of Γ(.) implicitly captures the level of uncertainty. A fixed ceiling Λ as in a typical cost-effective study is a degenerate case of our model, where Γ(Λ)=0 for Λ < Λ and the dislike jumps to infinity for Λ > Λ. A small degree of uncertainty is captured by a function Γ(Λ) that starts low but rises sharply around an uncertain threshold Λ. A smoother function Γ(Λ), that is less 'kinky', represents an increasing degree of uncertainty about the threshold after which we dangerously interfere with climate change.
In the numerical analysis, we opt for the latter approach. The welfare function above captures the idea that if one can limit the atmospheric concentration to some target, say 550 ppmv, at some costs, say a permanent 3 % loss of GDP, it could be an acceptable target. But if new evidence informs the representative agent that the same target would cost much more, say 20 % of GDP permanently, the representative agent may reconsider the target and decide to accept a higher level. Thus, the welfare function provides a structured interpretation of costeffective climate policies.
In the above set up, we assume that the risk for an undesired change to nature -it could but does not need to be a catastrophe -depends on the maximum perturbation of the atmospheric CO2 compared to the pre-industrial level. Furthermore, we assume that the climate system and the earth ecosystems change slowly so that the catastrophe does not have to materialize immediately, that is, increasing the atmospheric CO2, without observing a catastrophe, does not generate information about the threshold for a catastrophe. In the very simple form that we present here, the idea is that an increasing atmospheric CO2 increases the risk for some catastrophic event, but that the event may appear in the far future, even when the atmospheric concentrations have come down. 5 We describe the production side of the economy in reduced form by one equation. The set of feasible allocations is given by: G U 1 ; U 2 ; U 3 ; ::; Atm 1 ; Atm 2 ; Atm 3 ; ::
or reduced further
where G(.) is a continuously differentiable function, implicitly describing production, emissions, abatement efforts, and atmospheric CO2 dynamics. We assume that the feasibility set (U,Λ) is convex and smooth, so that G(.) is quasi-concave. 6 We can also interpret regulator τ's problem as a two-stage optimization problem. For each Λ, it can solve the production path that maximizes ∑ t = τ ∞ (1+ρ)
U t while satisfying Atm t ≤Λ, 5 If concentrations fall below a level that has been achieved in the past, this will likely be the result of technological change that also makes it unattractive economically to return to the previous concentration peak. Notwithstanding, the regulator could do so without increasing the catastrophe probability. 6 Convexity follows from decreasing returns to scale in production and utility. The condition applies in most IAMs. The set will be smooth as long as the atmospheric concentration increases. See footnote 10 for a discussion of what happens when concentrations become stationary.
t=1,…,∞. In the second stage, it chooses the value of Λ that maximizes (1). For a more detailed description of the optimality conditions in a simplified but analogous setting, see Michielsen (2013) . The resulting policies are time-inconsistent since as time passes the regulators' concern for consumption at a fixed future date (e.g., 2050) becomes more acute, yet concern for limiting climate change remains constant.
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When deciding on consumption, investment and energy use, regulator τ behaves as if it fully controls future decisions from period τ+1 onwards, giving rise to an endogenous optimal climate target from regulator τ's perspective. Consider the marginal rate of technological substitution (MRT) on the feasibility frontier for (U,Λ), between utility at time t≥τ, and the climate target 8 :
The variable MRT is the price (marginal costs) for a climate target in terms of utils at time t. It indicates how much consumption regulator τ must forego at time t to achieve a slightly tighter climate target. This price does not depend on the perceived welfare cost Γ(.), but only on the chosen path and production technology. We then compare the marginal rate of technological substitution with the regulator's willingness to trade off utility and the climate target in the objective function (marginal rate of substitution, MRS):
The MRS denotes the evaluation of the climate-utility trade off by the planner. MRS denotes the benefit, as perceived by the planner at time tau, of marginally relaxing the climate target, allowing for a small increase in utility of generation t.
9 As opposed to the MRT, the MRS does not depend on production technology but only on preferences. The last term τ in MRS(.) signals that the trade-off between utility and the climate target is specific for regulator τ.
Along the optimal path consistent with the plan at time τ, we have the first-order condition that the substitution possibility on the production side (MRT) equals the willingness to trade off on the welfare side (MRS):
When the MRS and MRT are equal, the regulator cannot improve its welfare by choosing a slightly more stringent or lenient climate target. We use the asterisk in Λ τ * to refer to the optimal choice from regulator τ 's perspective, and U τ * is the vector of utilities as envisaged by regulator τ.
At time τ+1, decisions are made by regulator τ+1, who attaches a higher weight (−1/ MRS) to the future utility stream U t vis a vis Γ(⋅) than regulator τ does. We see this when we evaluate the first-order condition (FOC) for the regulator in period τ+1, using the plan of the regulator τ:
Therefore, the first-order conditions for the planner at time τ+1 are not satisfied. From the perspective of planner τ+1, there is the option for a welfare improvement. Assuming that the feasibility set (U,Λ) is convex, the planner will increase current utility, and relax the stabili-
Numerical results
The economic module of our IAM is a standard Ramsey growth model. We assume full global cooperation on climate policies from the period '2020' onwards (the period with label '2020' spans 2016-2025) and no climate policy before that time. For comparison, we also present the path that would follow from a global cooperative solution in 2000. The carbon cycle includes ocean acidification and ocean-carbon saturation, and therefore has a larger long-term climate sensitivity with respect to cumulative emissions than many other IAMs (Gerlagh and Liski 2013) . A full description is available in the Methods appendix. Each regulator has a tenure of 10 years, that is, each decade the optimal path is re-evaluated by a new regulator that maximizes the same objective as the previous one, but because of the re-assignment of welfare weights, calculates a different optimal path. We calibrate the carbon cycle model such that it matches the Mauna Loa concentration data for 1959-2012 in combination with the CDIAC emission data. We calibrate a quadratic functional form for the climate cost function Γ(.) such that, given the initial conditions in 2000, the regulator wishes to stabilize the carbon concentration at 450 ppmv. 10 We run a Business as Usual (BAU) scenario (black) in which there is no climate policy, then a cost-effective scenario in 2000 (dark blue), where weights in the cost function Γ(.) are chosen such that 450 ppmv is reached. Then we follow the BAU scenario for the next 20 years, and re-optimize the model in 2020 (light blue line). From that period onwards, we re-optimize each next period (after 10 years) (grey lines). The resulting policy, which in the literature is often called the naive outcome, is portrayed in orange. We abstract from possible disruptive effects of catastrophes in our scenarios, that is, the scenarios are conditional on no catastrophe having occurred up to that time.
The 2000 and 2020 proposals cut emissions deeply. To reach the 450 for the 2000 proposal, emissions have to go down substantially, and carbon prices have to go up ( Figs. 1 and 2) . By 2020, after 20 years of assumed inaction (following BAU), a new plan is drawn that stabilizes the concentration at 475 ppmv. The increase of the stabilization target, by 25 ppmv, can be interpreted as the consequence of 20 years delay in policy, but our model also offers an alternative interpretation. We can see such when we consider the policy 10 years later. By 2030, when the climate policy proposal 2020 has been implemented for 10 years, the 2020 proposal is perceived as 'too costly'. The rational regulator in 2030 will revise the existing climate policy plans. We emphasize that the (perceived) climate gains are not changed, but that the net present value of costs imposed on the economy has increased, and thus, the proposal is watered down: the grey next line. The 2030 regulator is not mostly worried by the envisaged carbon prices of above 300 euro/tCO2 by 2100, but the carbon prices for 2030, and the associated economic costs, are considered too high from the 2030 regulator's perspective, and the concentration ceiling is lifted to 490 ppmv. Each next regulator continues slightly lifting the climate target, adding another grey line. In the outcome, the economy moves along the orange line. Carbon prices increase over time, but less than initially proposed. Emissions are reduced, but insufficiently to reach the original targets. This results in an eventual atmospheric CO2 of 570 ppmv.
Whereas the initial 2000 proposal limits the global temperature increase to just above two degrees Celsius, as the targets become progressively less stringent, the carbon concentration ultimately reaches 570 ppmv, which is associated with a global mean temperature increase above 3° (Figs. 3 and 4) .
Policy implications and relation to other models of target formation
Even if policymakers intend to achieve an ambitious climate target and can overcome the global free-rider problem, naivety with regards to future preferences can erode a substantial part of the potential gains from climate policy. Current regulators may be able to prevent the Fig. 1 Optimal emission levels per scenario gradual decrease in climate ambitions by initiating large-scale R&D programs that lower future mitigation costs and whose cancellation would result in the loss of significant sunk investments. The benefits of such programs in terms of committing future policymakers to current climate targets may outweigh the costs of decreased flexibility or too rapid investment compared to the current regulator's desired trajectory. Our conclusion thus goes an important step further compared to Wigley et al. (1996) recommendation that Bsufficient quantities of low-cost, low-carbon substitutes in the future requires a sustained commitment to research […] today^.
The effect of more sophisticated policies, under which each regulator recognizes the different preferences of its successors, on equilibrium global warming is unclear and depends on various characteristics. When the number of future generations that can affect the climate target is small, the current generation has a direct influence on future Fig. 2 Optimal carbon prices per scenario Fig. 3 Atmospheric CO2 per scenario. The dots at 3000 refer to the long-term persistent climate change effects. In the long run, income rises substantially, and the social costs of carbon increases alongside with damages, as captured through the temperature in Eq. 7 in the appendix (so, this is a different mechanism from Γ(Λ τ ) in the welfare functtion). See Gerlagh and Liski (2014) for further arguments supporting this finding. Emissions converge to zero, and the climate converges to its permanent level decisions. When current and future emissions are strategic substitutes, today's generation can pass on the costs of catastrophe prevention to the future by increasing its emissions. When current and future emissions are strategically independent (cf Iverson 2013), the sophisticated policy will closely resemble the naive outcome as presented here. For a further formal analysis, see Michielsen (2013) who derives unambiguous results for a reduced model.
As an alternative to cost-effective pathways based on preferences for climate stabilization, one can use an exclusively cost-benefit framework grounded in a comparison of the expected damages of climate change and the economic costs of preventative measures. Integrated Assessment Models (Nordhaus 1993 (Nordhaus , 2008 Manne et al. 1995) connect environmental and economic outcomes, and can thus produce 'optimal' climate targets that are less prone to criticisms of arbitrariness than those in multilateral agreements such as the Copenhagen Accord (Gerlagh and Sterner 2013) . However, we believe the double uncertainty regarding the climatic consequences of carbon emissions and the resulting impact on human well-being casts doubt on any attempt to explicitly monetize all climate damages. And while cost-effective pathways are subjective, or arbitrary, as they depend on the target or willingness to pay for stabilization, recommendations from cost-benefit IAMs calculations are sensitive to other contentious parameters.
The free-rider problem, political pressure from interest groups, international distributive justice disputes and other factors also contribute to inaction in climate mitigation. We do not suggest that these are unimportant. Rather, we highlight time-inconsistent policies as another mechanism that has received less attention so far. The numerical results in this paper suggest that as a result, climate change may ultimately be much more substantial than envisioned by current regulators in the absence of counterveiling policies.
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